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Football is often celebrated as a global language. No less global, though considerably 
less celebrated, is the plethora of football-specific clichés which make up the language of 
commentary, post-match interview and expert analysis. Often mocked, but rarely 
seriously analysed, the very ubiquity and persistence of these clichés suggests that their 
use is rather more than simple linguistic ‗laziness‘ on the part of pundits and players. We 
propose that the footballing cliché is in fact an integral thread in the broader fibre of 
modern football itself, a demonstrably functional feature of the everyday footballing 
lexicon, and is therefore worthy of investigation in its own right. After all, it‘s important 
to take each game as it comes. In order to explore the ordinary world of clichés in 
football, we will draw on the expertise of two philosophical pundits of our own: Hans-
Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) and (the later
1
) Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Prior to 
any actual analysis, however, we must first cast a glance at the field of play itself and ask: 
‗What exactly is a footballing cliché?‘ 
 
When it Comes to Definitions, Cliché Literally Gives 110% 
Early doors; our problem, philosophically speaking, is that the very notion of cliché 
itself seems to resist both ‗serious‘ analysis and straightforward definition. For a start, 
outside of football, cliché is often considered as simply a case of bad, lazy, or 
unimaginative expression, and hence written off before it can be taken seriously in terms 
of what it actually, constructively does for speakers and listeners. Moreover, there is a 
widespread, commonsense assumption that any cliché is instantly, recognisably ‗what it 
is‘. After all, is a cliché not largely defined by its extraordinary familiarity? But! If we 
look closer at the issue, we have a very real problem in defining a bona fide cliché at all. 
For example, one broad definition of cliché would be to say that it is more or less 
synonymous with a ‗stereotype‘ (the French verb clicher literally means ‗to stereotype‘). 
When we hear World Cup commentators describing the ‗silky skills of the Brazilians‘, 
the ‗ruthless efficiency‘ of the Germans, or the ‗tactical naïvety‘ of more or less any team 
from the African continent (regardless of what is actually happening on-field), we may 
well feel that there is more cliché than actual insight going on here. But at the same time, 
this definition seems too broad: if cliché is a stereotype, what makes it different from any 
                                               
1 It‘s rather important to note that Wittgenstein, in many respects the Brian Clough of twentieth century 
philosophy, is treated by philosophers as being ostensibly two different people. The ―early‖ Wittgenstein 
produced a rigid and largely intractable ―picture theory‖ of language that the ―later‖ Wittgenstein rejected 
more or less wholesale in favour of the approach articulated in this chapter. From here on, then, 
―Wittgenstein‖ will refer to his latter incarnation. 
 
other stereotyping? Why are we not more upset by such categorising of players on the 
grounds of race?   
 Bearing this in mind, we might adjust our definition and instead term cliché a 
predictable or unoriginal turn of phrase or action (indeed, this would be closer to the 
OED‘s account of the word). But again this might cover too much: consider the time that 
Gordan Strachan was asked in a post-match interview about, ―in what area the team 
played badly?‖ Strachan responded, ―the large rectangular green area.‖ An obvious 
answer—and given Strachan‘s renowned interview technique, very predictable—but 
certainly not as clichéd as the question. Perhaps, then, predictability is not so much the 
issue, as repetition. We could argue that a cliché is a phrase that has been repeated so 
much that it loses any real meaning. But simple repetition doesn‘t quite seem to capture 
the essence of cliché. After all, ―It‘s a goal!‖ is an oft-repeated phrase in football 
commentary, but isn‘t considered a cliché. ―The ball was still moving when it hit the back 
of the net,‖ as Kevin Keegan once astutely noticed (as opposed to those balls that hit the 
net whilst stationary), seems to capture something more of the style of cliché, despite the 
fact that, thankfully, it hasn‘t become a widely circulated statement.  
 Leaving simple repetition aside, then, we might go further and note that this 
‗style‘ of cliché involves non-sense of some kind or other. There certainly seems to be a 
way in which cliché limits or adjusts the literal sense that a phrase might have were it not 
a cliché. For example, the assertion that, ―there are no easy games in this competition,‖ 
might well flag-up the prestige of a particular tournament were it not for the fact that 
footballing pundits and professionals alike are inclined to make it, and are known to make 
it, when speaking of games in pretty much every competition—which rather negates the 
force of the claim in any given circumstance. Think also of that (frankly ungrammatical) 
bastion of post-match praise, ―the boy done good.‖ Nonsense it may be, with all the 
predictability of a Cristiano Ronaldo step-over, but the fact remains that a footballing 
cliché such as this is nonetheless meaningful and totemic—not least because its forms a 
discursive backbone to the expert analysis of football pundits on TV and radio the world 
over. In other words, there is a difference between an individual such as Alan Shearer, in 
his capacity as expert analyst on Match of the Day, declaring that in order to win, a team 
needs to, ―score more goals than the other side,‖ and the same sentiment echoed by Mr. 
A. Random-Fan in a pub discussion. In the hands of a known expert, cliché is (at least 
partially) lifted above the banality of repetition: it endows its user with an overriding 
authority for describing the game, and, in turn, the same clichéd words can become 
meaningful as expertise. This complicates the matter of what actually constitutes a 
footballing cliché further still: if the identity of the speaker functions as a modifier on 
whether a potentially clichéd phrase is hearable as a cliché at all as opposed to, say, 
‗expert knowledge‘, then we are forced to ask whether ‗cliché‘ is really a property of the 
actual words spoken, the speaker that speaks them, the context of their invocation or the 
interaction between all of these.  
Thus perhaps the question, ―What is a football cliché?‖—while strong on paper—
is likely to supply us with more problems than solutions. A better line of inquiry, and one 
which enables us to consider both Gadamer and Wittgenstein‘s views on meaning, would 
instead be, ―What makes a football cliché hearably so? What differentiates ‗meaningful‘ 
or ‗authoritative‘ use of language from mere lazy or banal cliché?‖  
 
Gadamer’s Game of Two Halves 
Any attempt to explain the off-side rule to the uninitiated will rapidly reveal that 
understanding does not take place in a vacuum. Much in a similar way, the approach to 
language taken by our first expert philosophy pundit, Hans-Georg Gadamer, suggests that 
we cannot understand the world without a ready-made ‗horizon‘ of meaning. For 
Gadamer, we do not simply arrive at an object of interpretation—be it a text, person, 
delightfully executed through-ball, or whatever—from nowhere. Rather, we are bound to 
a tradition of understanding which enables interpretation to begin. Such a situated-ness 
provides us with an ‗horizon‘ for understanding. This horizon is a constantly changing 
frame of reference, shaped and moved by our own situation in the world—our 
experiences, for example, or our place in history.  
This means that the act of understanding is to approach a situation with a set of 
pre-conceived notions, or as Gadamer calls them, ―prejudices.‖ He is keen to point out 
that the term ‗prejudice‘ is used here in the good sense, rather than the more popular bad 
sense of the word. For example, a good prejudice would be that I know West Ham wear 
claret and blue, I see you in those colours, and so I begin our conversation with the 
prejudicial idea already in place that you may well support West Ham; whatever you say 
I will likely understand on those terms. A less informative prejudice would be that I see 
you in West Ham colours, I presume your intelligence to be lacking and your taste 
nonexistent, and I promptly give up on all hope of conversing in anything other than 
grunts and impolite hand gestures. The latter is ‗bad‘ because it closes, rather than 
enables, our open-ness to other horizons of meaning. The key point is that, in the act of 
understanding a phrase, text, event, etc., we are able to adapt and develop our prejudices 
in terms of the object of understanding. Our interpretation of the world is, for Gadamer, 
much like the structure of a dialogue which runs back and forth between the interpreter, 
situated within the horizon of their contemporary culture, and the event, situated within 
the horizon of its occurrence. We understand, not by absorbing the event into our horizon 
(so it means whatever we want it to mean), or surrendering our own to its (so we deny 
our own situated-ness), but rather by ‗fusing‘ the two horizons, and in doing so, enlarging 
them. There is no meaning outside of this fusion of horizons: the cohesion of the dialogue 
(or ―good will‖—the assumption that there is understanding to be had between the two) 
creates the conditions on which we accept certain terms and meaningful and others as 
meaningless. 
How would this account of meaning explain football clichés? Clearly, if our 
knowledge of what a cliché is comes from stereotyping or repetition, then it would form 
part of our interpretative horizon. This means that it is not the case that cliché gets in the 
way of meaning, or confounds our understanding of the game. Rather, along with other 
aspects of our interpretative horizons such as knowing the rules of the game, recognising 
player‘s movements as well-played, and so on, cliché forms the very grounds on which 
we understand the game. It‘s not that cliché will tell us anything new about the on-field 
action, but rather that it enables any such new knowledge, by marking out the old.
 
As an 
example, consider Ian Holloway‘s brave attempt to answer a post-match question about 
an ―ugly‖ win against Chesterfield in 2004 without resorting to cliché, and instead 
utilising metaphor:  
To put it in gentleman's terms if you've been out for a night and you're 
looking for a young lady and you pull one, some weeks they're good 
looking and some weeks they're not the best. Our performance today 
would have been not the best looking bird but at least we got her in the 
taxi. She weren't the best looking lady we ended up taking home but she 
was very pleasant and very nice, so thanks very much, let's have a coffee. 
The result was a rather amused bafflement on behalf of everybody, and, whatever other 
reasons there were for this, at least one was the fact that Holloway had clearly acted so 
far outside of the horizon of expectation, the cohesion of our understanding was 
disrupted.  
 
Setting Gadamer’s Stall Out: Cynical Challenges 
Take, for example, Paul Scholes being red-carded for a characteristically physical two-
footed challenge at Old Trafford. Certain home fans (tired from their long journey up the 
M1) would perhaps see it as ‗not a foul at all‘. They would, of course, be remaining 
firmly within the boundaries of their own horizon, seeing the world as they wish to see it, 
and thus not really ‗understanding‘, certainly not in Gadamer‘s sense. The 
‗understanding‘ fans, instead, engage with the event dialogically: fusing their horizon 
(which includes certain presuppositions over the superiority of their team) with that of the 
event (where this is challenged), they may well conclude that the tackle was simply 
‗mistimed‘, the red card itself as ‗harsh‘ and its application as evidence of the referee‘s 
anti-United leanings. The same applies when, later that night on Match of the Day, pundit 
and former Liverpool defender Alan Hansen describes the challenge as ―cynical‖. A 
watching Manchester United supporter may well be more inclined to dismiss this as the 
tatty cliché of a career Liverpool fan than a piece of objective expert analysis. The 
accuracy of the description—if it can ever be accurate to attribute ‗cynicism‘ to a 
movement of one‘s legs in any statement other than a cliché—is determined in part by the 
standpoint from which one interprets. There is nothing outside of interpretation to appeal 
to. Were Hansen to describe the same event as, ―a touch of typical over-exuberance,‖ 
however, the same viewer may both interpret this as surprisingly unbiased analysis and 
adjust the standing of Hansen within their interpretative horizon accordingly.  
In this sense, our idea of what a cliché is will be already in place, based on our 
prior experiences and fluctuating horizons, before we encounter it. It forms part of our 
tradition, which constitutes us as understanding subjects. The ‗good will‘ of the dialogue 
explains the ‗non-serious‘ affirmation of the meaningless cliché as meaningful. 
Gadamer‘s use of ‗horizon‘ and ‗prejudice‘ turns away from the rather simplistic and 
more traditional notion that we understand every event in and by itself, and as such 
prejudice is something to be gotten rid of. In its place, Gadamer offers us a way of 
understanding how cliché not only affirms our knowledge of the game, but enables us to 
build on such an understanding. Cliché, at first, appears to constitute just such a horizon, 
which enables us to understand the game through the same necessary familiarity within 
any act of understanding.  
  
But That Wittgenstein, He’s Tough To Defend Against... 
This approach, however, does have limits. Rather than express the meaningfulness of 
cliché to understanding football, it would seem rather that Gadamer‘s philosophy aligns 
cliché with the banal. In other words, there is a hole in the defence—it does not account 
for the specific purpose of the footballer‘s cliché. 
Threading an incisive through ball through this is Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s assertion 
that, at the end of the day, the actual words we say (and what we intend them to mean) do 
not really matter so much as the differences those words make in the social world we 
inhabit. In short, the significance of a word, or phrase—or any other form of linguistic or 
physical action for that matter—is only definable in terms of what it does. To this extent, 
a phrase cannot be regarded a cliché until it does the job of a cliché in the practical 
context of its speaking any more than a firmly-uttered sentence is functionally a 
‗command‘ until someone actually obeys it.  
Think of our example of the red card at Old Trafford. Once the tackle has been 
made, and the red card shown, no amount of expert rumination in the commentary box on 
whether it was ―actually‖ a foul or not will alter the trajectory of that game. Nor will the 
specific intentions of the offending player as the challenge is made. The manner in which 
the referee interprets the action and intent, however, makes all the difference; if the 
challenge is taken by the referee to be a red card offence, then one team will then have to 
see out the remainder of the game without a full complement of players regardless of 
what pundits, fans or managers think. In short, the meaning of any such action is 
determined by what it does in the game. Wittgenstein himself argues that when one learns 
a language, one learns to play a ―language-game‖. A language-game is a ―form of life‖—
a way of being—and, like any other game (even football), is governed by rules. These 
rules are highly flexible, and relate to the functions that words can perform (asking, 
accusing, commanding, and the like) and also the activities with which linguistic actions 
are ―interwoven‖ (answering, admitting-denying, obeying, and so on).  
None of this is in any way innate; in order for people to make mutual sense, and 
therefore for social life to work at all, people require practical, first-hand training in the 
game. The rules in turn rest on upon shared, unspoken presumptions that people hold in 
common. These are not opinions, or matters of choice. They are the truths known, and 
held to be immutable by players of the game, and on the bedrock of which opinions and 
discussions are built. That Bobby Moore was ―a great player‖ remains an opinion, no 
matter how easy it is to agree with. That Bobby Moore was ―a footballer‖, meanwhile, is 
a foundational truth necessarily shared by all those acculturated in the language-game of 
English football. Failure to recognise this truth would inevitably disrupt any claim to 
broader footballing competence in a discussion where Bobby Moore himself became 
relevant.  
Forms of life are, thus, learned in the doing. The language of football is learned 
through talking and reading about football, and listening to others talk about football. 
Common truths are peculiar to (fan) groups, given words can have a variety of meanings 
in different contexts and there are also countless, fluid types of phrase which serve as 
vehicles for interaction.  This is why it is a virtual impossibility to seem expert in a 
second-language by simply learning the grammars and vocabulary from a book, and very 
difficult to sustain a convincing pub conversation on the current English Premiership 
season by simply knowing facts and figures. Particular meaning in any language-game is 
always bound-up in such cultural, regional and contextual complexities as ―manners‖, 
―irony‖, ―common knowledge‖ and so forth. Meaning in the everyday language of 
football is no different, always being achieved through particular, and sometimes 
specialised, idioms. You may well favour the assertion that football is, ―a symmetrically 
dichotomised competitive physical practice,‖ when making your point, but your friends 
in the Dog and Duck might better understand, ―a game of two halves.‖ Then again they 
might not. You won‘t really know until you try.    
 
Wittgenstein: Taking It One Game At A Time 
So, we would ask, how does this help understand the place and significance of football‘s 
clichés? A good place to start might well be Wittgenstein‘s critique of James George 
Frazer‘s The Golden Bough, a famous anthropological study of ritualistic ceremonies in 
―primitive‖ tribes. Frazer argues the rationalistic line that since many such rituals 
(fundamentally) project an impossible cause-effect (for example, that a rain dance will 
make it rain), the thinking behind them can be regarded neither logical nor 
comprehensible but is instead simply the mechanical outcome of false beliefs and 
pseudo-science. To this extent, Frazer essentially claims that a ritual such as a rain dance 
is itself a kind of cliché, an action that is unthinkingly and recurrently reproduced, and 
imbued with a unified (and largely nonsensical) meaning to practitioner and audience 
alike—―let‘s make it rain.‖  
Wittgenstein savaged this perspective with some vigour, claiming that it missed 
the expressive-symbolic point of such human activity completely. Practitioners of rain 
dances are not generally inclined to perform them in isolation, or outside of the rainy 
season. Equally, to take a potentially ‗clichéd‘ action from the world of football, we 
would venture that today‘s footballers rarely kiss the badges on their shirts without an 
audience, outside of the context of a goal celebration (or other equally positive moment), 
or in the genuine expectation of a definable impact on the scoreline. Badge-kissing, like 
rain-dancing, can and should be understood as part of a form of life, fully intelligible to 
others who share it. But, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, we can take this point a 
little further still. Kissing a badge can both foreground the importance of the symbol 
itself as an object of collective esteem, and also signal one‘s own allegiance to it. 
Moreover, the gesture would likely have rather greater contextual significance to fans 
were it known that the player‘s future at the club is uncertain, though not mechanically 
so. What might be interpreted as a sincere expression of loyalty can also be read as a 
cheap and clichéd attempt by the player to win the fans‘ favour while concurrently trying 
to find a different club with a more personally profitable wage-structure—the exact 
opposite of loyalty. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, no action has, in itself, a pre-
definable essence. It is what it does on the day, as part of a broader web of similarly 
meaningful actions. For example, is the player who kisses his badge cheered or booed, or 
even ignored? The ultimate, contextual meaning of the act—be that ―an expression of 
loyalty‖ or ―a self-serving cliché‖—only ossifies in the ways that it alters that context. 
This is the way that, for Wittgenstein, meaning works in ‗real life‘; people (other than 
philosophers of language, perhaps) are not really concerned, in the course of their 
everyday routines, with trying to find idealised and universal meanings. They want to 
know what the materials in front of them – words, phrases and gestures - are specifically 
about, which of the range of possible interpretations works best in-that-case. This 
requires that they take things one game, one context, at a time. This, clearly, renders 
problematic a Gadamerian understanding of any action—such as Alan Hansen claiming 
that a Paul Scholes challenge was ―cynical‖—as pre-determinably clichéd or banal. For 
Wittgenstein, specific meaning is located in practices of talking, writing and gesturing 
themselves, not in a ‗horizon‘. 
 
A Funny Old Game 
While this chapter primarily addresses the differences between Gadamer and 
Wittgenstein, it‘s important to note that there are many convergences between the 
philosophical approaches of the two (there are, after all no easy games at this level). 
Foremost of these is that both treat language as a chiefly expressive medium—something 
in and through which meaning is actively created and modified—rather than a 
designative one, from which point of view we might be currently more concerned with 
analysing the truth of a football cliché against the real world situation to which it has 
been applied. Designatively speaking, football is indeed a game of two halves. No 
contest. Unless, of course, the match is abandoned at half time. Or there‘s extra time. And 
then the analysis kind of swings on whether we are using ‗half‘ to describe a literal 50% 
of the game, or a 45 minute period of play. And a particular game of football, or football 
in general. All of which are interesting matters, but none of which help us get any closer 
to understanding the core issues pertaining to football clichés themselves. 
Both, too, are relatively relaxed about the rules of understanding, insofar as they 
correspond to their general models of meaning: for Gadamer, the dialogical fusion of 
horizons, for Wittgenstein the moves in the language game. When Alan Shearer declares 
that the trailing team ―needs to score more goals‖, neither approach fixes the meaning of 
cliché rigidly to, for example, Shearer‘s intention, or to the audience‘s reception. How 
one reaches the meaning of expression, for both, is based on an interactive sense of play, 
within the broad confines of either dialogical fusion or language game. 
Core to Gadamer‘s whole analysis is the idea of horizon as a prejudice which 
informs any interpretation of the world: a historical, cultural, cognitive frame of reference 
(albeit a flexible one) that an individual carries like a constantly-revised encyclopaedia. If 
the ―Recognised Football Clichés‖ page contains the expressions, ―a game of two 
halves,‖ and, ―the boy done good,‖ then these phrases can be understood as being clichés 
when uttered in the context of all things football. This notion, that that an expression has 
the status of ‗a cliché‘ prior to its actual, practical utterance, is the key point at which the 
philosophies of Gadamer and Wittgenstein begin to diverge. For Gadamer, the meaning 
of cliché is effectively pre-established. When we hear claims such as, ―they gave 110%,‖ 
or, ―he literally drove a bus through the defence,‖ we do not immediately question our 
understanding of mathematics or how one fits a double-decker through the player‘s 
tunnel. Rather, the nonsense of each phrase establishes a certain commonality which 
enables understanding to happen. If one was to take ―110%‖ as a genuine mathematical 
puzzle, rather than an expression of footballing effort, one would clearly not be partaking 
in the same dialogue as the football pundit, and a fusion of horizons would be unlikely to 
emerge. 
 For Wittgenstein, meanwhile, the self-same phrases may be heard and understood 
in a range of different ways, depending on their contextual uses: as jokes, perhaps (if 
deployed with a smirk, and invoking a laugh, it is difficult to uphold an interpretation of 
the familiar expression as simple lazy language-use), as universal tools for description or, 
indeed, as banalities or clichés. What a phrase means is what it does, and what it does is 
only evident in the differences it makes after the fact. Indeed, and to these ends, we may 
well wish to look at the function of labelling the very phrase, ―they gave 110%,‖ as banal 
or clichéd at all; these words are themselves parts of a language-game, largely used as 
accusations—to diminish the value of what has been said, and/or the authority of the 
person who said it. So who describes a familiar football phrase as a cliché? And when? 
And to what ends? You‘ll rarely see the term ―cliché‖ used in an academic paper outside 
of a narrative on declining standards of language. If you‘re looking for an explanation of 
why clichés are clichés, this approach probably isn‘t very satisfactory. But as 
Wittgenstein himself said, people often get hung up on the need for an all-encompassing 
explanation of why things are, when the real solution is a description of how they work. It 
seems that, in this sense, the philosophy of language can indeed be a ―funny old game.‖ 
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